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MIDLAND FUNDING V. JOHNSON
AND THE PERNICIOUS PROBLEM OF
STALE-DEBT CLAIMS
Kara J. Bruce*
I. INTRODUCTION
Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson1 represents the culmination of
a nationwide litigation blitz to combat the filing of “stale-debt claims”
in consumer bankruptcy cases. Debt buyers, who purchase portfolios
of old debt for pennies on the dollar, have filed massive numbers of
proofs of claim in consumer bankruptcy cases to collect debts for
which the statute of limitations has run. This practice is predicated on
the expectation that the bankruptcy system will fail to screen out all
time-barred debts, and as a result, that some of these stale-debt claims
will receive payment in a debtor’s bankruptcy case. Because the
Bankruptcy Code and Rules provide no clear remedy for deterring this
practice, debtors’ attorneys recently turned to the private remedies
available under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA” or
the “Act”).2 They argued that filing a stale-debt claim is false,
deceptive, or misleading because it misrepresents the enforceability of
the debt, or that the practice is an unfair or unconscionable use of the
bankruptcy process.3
In Midland Funding, the Supreme Court held in a 5-3 decision
that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt, without more, does
not violate the FDCPA. This holding leaves bankruptcy professionals
to reckon with the gaps in bankruptcy’s existing remedial structure as
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University
of Toledo College of Law. My thanks to Alexandra Sickler, Chris Bradley, Melissa Jacoby, Bob
Lawless, and the participants at the Young Bankruptcy Scholars’ Workshop at Brooklyn Law
School for refining my thinking on this topic. Breanne Hitchen provided helpful research
assistance.
1. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017).
2. See Kara J. Bruce, Debt Buyers Beware: Filing Proofs of Claim for Time-Barred Debt in
the Eleventh Circuit and Beyond, BANKR. L. LTR., June 2016, at 5.
3. See id.
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they seek to address the massive numbers of time-barred debt claims
that pass through the bankruptcy process. While Midland Funding
does not foreclose the FDCPA’s application to bankruptcy altogether,
the Court’s sweeping language, together with its decision in a related
FDCPA case,4 might sharply limit the FDCPA’s utility in the future.
This Comment considers Midland Funding’s effect on the
bankruptcy system’s ability to police stale-debt claims. It begins by
explaining how the practice of filing time-barred debt claims takes
advantage of gaps in bankruptcy’s enforcement structure. It then
describes the rash of FDCPA lawsuits leading up to Midland Funding,
as well as the majority and dissenting opinions in Midland Funding.
Finally, this Comment considers some analytical deficiencies in the
majority’s opinion and briefly outlines several actual or anticipated
effects of the ruling.
II. THE PROBLEM OF TIME-BARRED DEBT CLAIMS
Over the last decade or more, debt buyers have used the
bankruptcy system to seek payment of old, often time-barred debt
from consumers.5 Although the expiration of a statute of limitations
provides a complete defense to the collectability of stale debts, debt
collectors apparently rely on the expectation that a percentage of these
claims will pass through the bankruptcy process without notice, and
will therefore receive some amount of distribution or plan payments
from a debtor’s bankruptcy case.6 This section explains the structural
realities of the bankruptcy process that make this practice a profitable
one. It then describes how debtors have brought suit under the FDCPA
to combat the practice, generating the case law leading up to Midland
Funding.
A. Collecting Debt in Bankruptcy: The Proof-of-Claim Process
A creditor of a debtor in bankruptcy has a “claim” against the
bankruptcy estate for the amount the debtor owes.7 If a creditor wishes
4. See infra Part IV (discussing Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718
(2017)).
5. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 1 for a discussion of this phenomenon.
6. See id. at 3.
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012) (defining “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured” or a “right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment”).
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to receive a share of any distributions from a debtor’s bankruptcy case,
the creditor typically files a “proof of claim”8 as evidence of the
character and amount of the claim.9 To the extent that a claim is
“allowed” in the bankruptcy case, it will receive a distribution of any
available assets or plan payments.10
Section 502(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the allowance
of claims. It provides that a claim shall be allowed “except to the
extent that . . . such claim is unenforceable . . . under any agreement
or applicable law.”11 Claims that are subject to a statute-of-limitations
defense are unenforceable under applicable law and are thus subject
to disallowance. Yet proofs of claim are entitled to prima facie
validity.12 As such, if no party files an objection, claims are “deemed
allowed” and eventually receive a pro-rata share of any distribution
from the debtor’s estate.13
In addition to the prima facie validity of claims, economic
realities facilitate the collection of time-barred debts in consumer
bankruptcy cases. Debt buyers, who are primarily responsible for
filing stale-debt claims, typically buy massive amounts of old debt for
pennies on the dollar. According to the Federal Trade Commission,
debt buyers can pay as little as two cents on the dollar for debts older
than six years, and “effectively nothing” for debts greater than fifteen
years old.14 Likewise, filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy is a
relatively inexpensive undertaking; no filing fee is required, and
creditors can complete and electronically submit a simple PDF form.15
8. A proof of claim is a simple legal document, signed under penalty of perjury, which sets
forth a creditor’s claim. It typically includes copies of supporting documentation to establish the
basis of the claim. See OFFICIAL FORM 410, PROOF OF CLAIM, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/form_b410.pdf; FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001.
9. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 501.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2017).
10. Id. at ¶ 502.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017). In a chapter 7
case, creditors are satisfied primarily through the liquidation of a debtor’s property. The chapter 7
trustee seizes and sells certain property of the debtor and distributes the proceeds to claims
according to the bankruptcy’s priority structure. In a chapter 13 case, debtors form a plan to pay
creditors a portion of their income over time. The chapter 13 trustee distributes these “plan
payments” on behalf of creditors.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (2012).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(f).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012).
14. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING
INDUSTRY 23–24 (2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/structure-andpractices-debt-buying-industry/debtbuyingreport.pdf.
15. See OFFICIAL FORM 410, PROOF OF CLAIM, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
form_b410.pdf;
Bankruptcy
Court
Miscellaneous
Fees
Schedule,
U.S. CTS.,
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Given the low cost of purchasing and filing stale-debt claims, it is easy
to see how debt buyers might profit if only a very small portion of
time-barred debts are deemed allowed.16
Conversely, the parties who are best positioned to review and
object to claims—the chapter 7 or 13 trustee, the debtor, or another
creditor—face a number of impediments to actually completing the
task. First, a trustee is appointed in every consumer bankruptcy case
and is charged with the duty to “examine proofs of claims and object
to the allowance of any claim that is improper” if a purpose would be
served by doing so.17 Yet chapter 7 and 13 trustees often carry massive
caseloads and have a variety of statutory duties in addition to the
monitoring of claims.18 What is more, determining whether a debt is
time-barred often requires the trustee to investigate choice of law,
tolling, and revival—information to which the trustee might not have
ready access.19 Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that trustees will catch
all of the problematic claims that debt buyers file.20 Moreover,
expecting trustees’ offices to undertake a more robust and timeintensive claim review might increase the costs of administrating
bankruptcy cases, and such costs ultimately would be passed along to
creditors who have complied with bankruptcy law and procedure.
Debtors have better information about the origin and status of the
debt, but often lack a financial incentive to object to claims because
the allowance or disallowance of a stale-debt claim will not alter their
personal outcomes in bankruptcy.21 Indeed, debtors might have strong
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/fees/bankruptcy-court-miscellaneous-fee-schedule (last
visited Mar. 15, 2019).
16. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC
v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b)(1) (2012).
18. See Kara Bruce, Closing Consumer Bankruptcy’s Enforcement Gap, 69 BAYLOR L. REV.
479, 491–92 (2017).
19. See Brief for Nat’l Assoc. of Chapter Thirteen Trs. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7449176 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348); see
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v.
Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348).
20. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were amended in 2012 in order to make staledebt claims easier to detect. Rule 3001(c)(3) requires the holder of a claim based on an “open-end
or revolving consumer credit agreement” to disclose certain information relevant to determining
timeliness. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3001(c)(3). Yet even after these amendments, claims do not include
all of the information needed to conclusively determine whether the statute of limitations has
expired. See Brief for Nat’l Assoc. of Chapter Thirteen Trs. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson at 14, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (No. 16-348).
21. W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., ET AL., CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 17:3 (2d ed.
2017) (noting that in a chapter 13 bankruptcy case, “unless the debtor’s plan provides for the
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disincentives to object to stale-debt claims, insofar as the cost of filing
an objection might not be included in the debtor’s fee agreement with
his or her attorney.22
Finally, although competing creditors might stand to gain a
greater share of a debtor’s assets or plan payments if the stale-debt
claim is disallowed, the amounts at issue in a single bankruptcy case
are typically too small to justify building routine claim review into the
scope of their creditors’-rights work. Moreover, some courts have
questioned whether creditors have standing to object to proofs of
claim.23
Some debtors’ attorneys responded to this imbalance by
challenging the filing of stale-debt claims using the FDCPA.24 Debtors
argued that debt buyers engage in false, deceptive, misleading, unfair,
or unconscionable conduct when they seek to collect stale debt
through bankruptcy’s proof-of-claim process.25 These cases sought to
increase the cost to debt collectors of filing time-barred claims in order
to provide a more meaningful deterrent than the Bankruptcy Code
otherwise provides.26 The following sub-parts introduce the FDCPA
and discuss its application to the pernicious problem of stale-debt
claims.
B. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and
its Application to Stale-Debt Claims
Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1978 to “eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt
collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are
not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State
action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”27 The Act
payment of all unsecured claims in full, disallowance of reduction of an unsecured claim may not
affect how much she pays to complete her plan”).
22. Id.; see also Bruce, supra note 18, at 504 (explaining that fee agreements in bankruptcy
often carve out adversary matters to ensure a low cost of access to bankruptcy).
23. Compare, e.g., In re Bozman, 403 B.R. 494, 496 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that a
creditor may object), with In re Micro-Precision Techs., Inc., 303 B.R. 238, 243 (Bankr. D. N.H.
2003) (citations omitted) (holding that creditors lack “full and unfettered” standing to object), and
Eastgate Enters., Inc. v. Funk (In re Meade Land & Dev. Co.), 1 B.R. 279, 279–82 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1979) (holding that creditors generally should channel their objections through the appointed
trustee to further orderly administration of the estate).
24. Bruce, supra note 2, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).
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prohibits, among other things, debt-collection actions that are “false,
deceptive, or misleading” and “unfair or unconscionable.”28 It
provides consumers a private right of action to recover actual
damages, statutory damages, and reasonable attorney’s fees and
costs.29
The FDCPA has long been applied to punish the collection of
stale debts outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, every federal court of
appeals to hear the issue has held or suggested that filing or threatening
suit to collect debts for which the statute of limitations has run violates
the Act.30 In so holding, courts have highlighted the information
asymmetry between consumers and debt collectors: consumers may
not realize their rights have been violated, or may not have the
fortitude or financial resources to challenge the behavior when it has
occurred.31 As such, debt collectors engage in false, deceptive, or
misleading conduct when they threaten or pursue enforcement of stale
debts.32
Whether this precedent applies with equal force to the collection
of debts in bankruptcy is a question that, before Midland Funding,
divided lower courts.33 Some courts, most notably the Eleventh Circuit
in Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC,34 held that debtors in bankruptcy
are just as vulnerable to creditor overreaching as debtors who are sued
in state court, and as such, the FDCPA should likewise bar the
collection of stale debts through bankruptcy’s proof-of-claim
process.35 Other courts disagreed, pointing to a variety of procedural
28. Id. at 1692(e), 1692(f).
29. Id. at 1692(k).
30. See, e.g., Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2013); Huertas
v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32–33 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Castro v. Collecto, Inc., 634
F.3d 779, 783 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting in dicta that “threatening to sue on time-barred debt may well
constitute a violation of the FDCPA”); Freyermuth v. Credit Bureau Servs., 248 F.3d 767, 771 (8th
Cir. 2001) (suggesting that filing or threatening suit to collect time-barred debt violates
the FDCPA, but finding no FDCPA violation in the case at hand because the debt collector never
took such actions).
31. Kimber v. Fed. Fin. Corp., 668 F. Supp. 1480, 1487 (M.D. Ala. 1987).
32. Id. at 1488–89.
33. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 2.
34. 758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).
35. Id. at 1262; see also Taylor v. Midland Funding, LLC, 94 F. Supp. 3d 941, 948–49 (N.D.
Ill. 2015); Brimmage v. Quantum3 Grp., LLC (In re Brimmage), 523 B.R. 134, 141 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2015); Grandidier v. Quantum3 Grp., LLC, No. 1:14-CV-00138-RLY-TAB, 2014 WL
6908482, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2014); Reed v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 181 F. Supp. 3d 523, 530
(N.D. Ill. 2015); Avalos v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Avalos), 531 B.R. 748, 757 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 2015); Edwards v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Edwards), 539 B.R. 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2015).
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distinctions that place debtors in a fundamentally different position
than their state-court counterparts, and therefore holding that the filing
of a time-barred proof of claim is not false, deceptive, misleading,
unfair, or unconscionable under the Act.36
Courts were likewise divided on whether the FDCPA should have
any application in bankruptcy. Some courts held that the FDCPA
cannot apply in bankruptcy, as its provisions stand in “irreconcilable
conflict” with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.37 This issue,
which is typically characterized as whether the later-enacted
Bankruptcy Code impliedly repeals the FDCPA, has generated a threeway circuit split. The Ninth Circuit completely precludes the
application of the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters, while the Second
Circuit holds that matters arising before the debtor’s discharge cannot
support an FDCPA claim.38 Other circuits, including the Third,
Seventh, and most recently, the Eleventh, have held that FDCPA
liability can arise in active bankruptcy cases, including in the proofof-claim context.39 The following section outlines the facts and
procedural history of the Eleventh Circuit case, Johnson v. Midland
Funding, LLC,40 and its continuation to the Supreme Court in Midland
Funding v. Johnson.
C. Midland Funding v. Johnson
In March 2014, Aleida Johnson filed a petition for relief under
chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code in the Southern District of
36. See, e.g., Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2015); Broadrick v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Broadrick), 532 B.R. 60, 75 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 2015); Donaldson v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1040 (S.D. Ind. 2015);
LaGrone v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re LaGrone), 525 B.R. 419, 427 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015);
Torres v. Cavalry SPV I, LLC, 530 B.R. 268, 276 (E.D. Pa. 2015); Jenkins v. Genesis Fin. Sols.
(In re Jenkins), 456 B.R. 236, 240 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2011); B-Real, LLC v. Rogers, 405 B.R. 428,
434 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2009).
37. See, e.g., Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 470 (S.D. Ala.
2015), rev’d, 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S.
Ct. 1407 (2017), vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2017). (“[T]he Code permits creditors to file
proofs of claim in Chapter 13 proceedings on debts known to be time-barred, while the Act
prohibits debt collectors from engaging in such conduct. There is thus an obvious tension between
the Act and the Code.”).
38. See Walls v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 276 F.3d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 2002); Simmons v.
Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 2010).
39. See Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 2004); Simon v. FIA Card Servs.,
N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2013); Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1335
(11th Cir. 2016).
40. 823 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Alabama.41 Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland Funding”), a
commercial debt purchaser, filed a proof of claim in Johnson’s
bankruptcy case asserting a debt of $1,879.71.42 Johnson had
originally incurred this debt to Fingerhut Credit Advantage, which at
some point before the bankruptcy case had sold the debt to Midland
Funding.43 Midland Funding disclosed on the face of the proof of
claim that the last payment on the debt had been made, and the account
had been charged off, more than ten years before the bankruptcy
filing.44 The applicable statute of limitations for the debt was six
years.45
Johnson, through counsel, objected to Midland Funding’s proof
of claim because it was sought to collect time-barred debt.46 Midland
Funding did not respond, and the court disallowed the claim.47 The
debtor then sued Midland Funding in federal district court, arguing
that filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt was false, deceptive,
misleading, unfair, and unconscionable under the FDCPA.48 Johnson
asserted that Midland Funding, like many commercial debt
purchasers, engaged in a pattern and practice of filing time-barred debt
claims in bankruptcy cases.49 It alleged that this practice overloaded
the bankruptcy courts and was an unconscionable use of the
bankruptcy process.50
The district court held the FDCPA did not apply to the creditor’s
filing of a time-barred debt claim because the FDCPA and Bankruptcy
Code stood in “irreconcilable conflict.”51 The Eleventh Circuit
reversed, aligning with the Third and Seventh Circuits to hold that the
FDCPA could apply in bankruptcy.52 The Eleventh Circuit
underscored that the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code “provid[e]

41. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.
42. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. Johnson, 823 F.3d at 1336.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 528 B.R. 462, 473 (S.D. Ala. 2015), rev’d, 823 F.3d
1334 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017),
vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2017).
52. Id.
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different tiers of sanctions for creditor misbehavior in bankruptcy.”53
While the Bankruptcy Code provides for disallowance and perhaps
sanctions for the filing of improper claims, the FDCPA supplies “an
additional layer of protection” to consumers when a creditor, which
qualifies as a “debt collector,” engages in behavior that violates the
Act.54 The court then applied existing circuit precedent laid out in
Crawford v. LVNV Funding LLC, and held that the FDCPA could be
violated if a creditor knowingly filed a proof of claim on a time-barred
debt.55
Midland Funding filed a petition for certiorari, seeking review of
two questions: (1) whether filing a proof of claim that accurately
asserts a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA; and (2) whether the
Bankruptcy Code precludes the application of the FDCPA to this
issue.56 The Supreme Court granted the petition and, in May 2017,
decided Midland Funding v. Johnson.57
III. THE COURT’S DECISION
The Supreme Court held, in a 5-3 decision, that filing a facially
accurate proof of claim asserting a time-barred debt does not violate
the FDCPA.58 The majority opinion portrayed consumer bankruptcy
as containing robust structural protections that easily protect against
debt-collector misconduct, and depicted debtors in bankruptcy as less
vulnerable to creditor misconduct than the average consumer.59
Accordingly, the Court viewed application of the FDCPA in this
context as unnecessary and procedurally burdensome.60 The dissent
appeared to describe an entirely different legal system, focusing on
overworked bankruptcy professionals and a business model that
exploited structural gaps for profit.61 From this vantage point, the

53. Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, 823 F.3d 1334, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017), vacated, 868 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir.
2017)
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1342.
56. Petition for Writ of Certoriari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 4983173 at
*I (Sept. 14, 2016) (No. 16-348), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 326 (2016).
57. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2017).
58. Id. at 1411. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the opinion. Id. at 1407.
59. See id. at 1414.
60. Id. at 1415.
61. See id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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dissent viewed the FDCPA to be central to rebalancing bankruptcy’s
playing field and deterring abusive claims practices.
A. “False, Deceptive, or Misleading”
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, found it
“reasonably clear” that a facially accurate, but time-barred proof of
claim is not “false, deceptive or misleading” under section 1692e of
the FDCPA.62 That the statute of limitations had run, the Court
explained, did not change the fact that the creditor has the right to
payment and a “claim” against the debtor’s estate.63 The Court
underscored that the expiration of the statute of limitations amounts to
an affirmative defense, and found “nothing misleading or deceptive”
in the act of filing a proof of claim that is subject to an affirmative
defense.64
The Court explained that “to determine whether a statement is
misleading normally ‘requires consideration of the legal sophistication
of its audience.’”65 Chapter 13 cases feature a knowledgeable trustee,
who is charged with the duty to examine proofs of claim. The Court
concluded that “that trustee is likely to understand that . . . a proof of
claim is a statement by the creditor that he or she has a right to payment
subject to disallowance,” and would therefore not be misled by a stale
claim.66
B. “Unfair or Unconscionable”
Whether filing a proof of claim for time-barred debt is “unfair or
unconscionable” under section 1692f “present[ed] a closer
question.”67 The Court noted that several circuit courts have held that
filing a civil suit to recover a time-barred debt violates the FDCPA,
because unsophisticated consumers might not realize that the statute
of limitations could present a defense, the passage of time dulls a
consumer’s memory and makes it more difficult to defend against a
collection, and “a consumer might pay a stale debt simply to avoid the
cost and embarrassment of suit.”68 The Court held, however, that
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1412.
Id. at 1413.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“[t]hese considerations have significantly diminished force in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy.”69
The Court relied on several features of bankruptcy law and
procedure to support this distinction. First, because consumers
voluntarily initiate chapter 13 cases, it is less likely that they might
pay a debt to avoid the cost and embarrassment of suit.70 Second, a
“knowledgeable trustee is available.”71 Third, “[p]rocedural
bankruptcy rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims.”72 The
Court concluded that bankruptcy’s claims resolution process is “‘a
more streamlined and less unnerving prospect’” than a civil suit to
collect time-barred debt.73
The Court was not moved by the evidence of this practice’s
impact on debtors or the bankruptcy process as a whole.74 It noted that
stale claims frequently do not affect the debtor’s financial contribution
to a bankruptcy case, and stated that some debtors might even realize
benefits when a stale debt discharged in bankruptcy no longer mars
their credit reports.75 The Court did not comment on the strain the mass
filing of time-barred debt claims has placed on the bankruptcy
system.76 It repeatedly expressed concern, however, that FDCPA
litigation could place additional strains on the court system.77 The
Court noted that FDCPA claims could result in “added complexity,
changes in settlement incentives, and a shift from the debtor to the
creditor the obligation to investigate the staleness of a claim.”78 It
closed by noting that to apply the FDCPA in the bankruptcy context

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Gatewood v. CP Med., LLC (In re Gatewood), 533 B.R. 905, 909 (B.A.P. 8th
Cir. 2015)).
74. Id. at 1414.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 1410, 1415 (“[A] change in the simple affirmative-defense approach, carving
out an exception, itself would require defining the boundaries of the exception . . . . To find the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act applicable here would . . . authorize a new significant bankruptcyrelated remedy in the absence of language in the Code providing for it . . . . [I]t would permit
postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court concerning a creditor’s state of mind . . . [and]
it would require creditors . . . to investigate the merits of an affirmative defense (typically the
debtor’s job to assert and prove).”).
78. Id. at 1415.
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would upset the “delicate balance” of debtor and creditor protections
created by the Bankruptcy Code and procedural rules.79
C. “Everyone with Experience in the Matter”
The dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan, began by explaining how debt buyers have built
a profitable business model on the collection of stale debts, winning
“billions of dollars in default judgments simply by filing suit and
betting that consumers will lack the resources to respond.”80 The
dissent noted that FDCPA claims have “largely beaten back” this
practice in state courts.81 Now that debt buyers have continued this
practice in the bankruptcy courts, the dissenting justices found “no
sound reason” to depart from the precedent that finds that collection
of time-barred debts violates the FDPCA.82
The dissent took aim at the majority’s comfort with bankruptcy’s
structural protections, highlighting how they fail to adequately protect
against the inadvertent collection of stale debts in bankruptcy.83 The
dissent took particular issue with the majority’s reliance on the chapter
13 trustee to police the bankruptcy claims process, noting that
“everyone with actual experience in the matter insists [the majority’s
understanding] is false.”84 Trustees carry large caseloads and have
statutory duties far beyond objecting to stale-debt claims. The dissent
underscored that they “cannot realistically be expected to identify
every time-barred . . . claim filed in every bankruptcy.”85
The dissent also questioned the assertion that a chapter 13 debtor
is better positioned to respond to misconduct than her non-bankruptcy
counterpart.86 Someone who has just sought court protection from
overwhelming debt “is arguably more vulnerable in bankruptcy—not
less—to the oversights that the debt buyers know will occur.”87 In
addition, the dissent noted that bankruptcy’s procedural rules do not

79. Id.
80. Id. at 1416–17 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1417.
82. Id. at 1414–18.
83. Id. at 1420.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Midland
Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 2016 WL 7422733 (U.S. 2016) (No. 16-348)).
86. Id. at 1420–21.
87. Id. at 1421.
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protect against the inadvertent payment of stale-debt claims.88 As to
the majority’s suggestion that debtors might be better off if these
claims were disposed of in bankruptcy, the dissent cited several
counterfactuals to show that this practice might render debtors worse
off “than had they never entered bankruptcy at all.”89
Finally, the dissent took pains to underscore that the majority’s
opinion was reached on narrow grounds and did not need to “be the
last word on the matter.”90 It looked to Congress to clarify that these
practices violate the FDCPA.91
IV. MIDLAND FUNDING’S TROUBLING LEGACY
The Court’s opinion in Midland Funding comes from a
perspective of procedural idealism, and at times seems divorced from
the day-to-day reality of bankruptcy cases.92 This dissonance
exacerbates an enforcement gap in bankruptcy’s proof of claim
process, straining the court’s existing machinery to address stale-debt
claims. More broadly, the Court’s decision features several sweeping
statements about the purpose and scope of the FDCPA that, especially
in conjunction with other recent Court opinions, threaten to drive the
FDCPA into obsolescence.93 The following subsections address these
issues.

88. Id.
89. Id. Although not addressed in the dissent, another point worth noting here is that class
actions are winding their way through the appellate courts based on creditors’ failure to remove
discharged debts from credit reports. See In re Anderson, 553 B.R. 221, 225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2016), appeal docketed, No. 16-2496 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016). This case law provides another
example of the majority’s structural protections failing to match the realities of bankruptcy practice.
90. Id. at 1419, 1421.
91. Id. at 1421.
92. In this respect, Midland Funding hardly stands alone. The bankruptcy literature contains
many examples of Supreme Court cases that fail to appreciate the realities of bankruptcy practice.
See Melissa B. Jacoby, Superdelegation and Gatekeeping in Bankruptcy Courts, 87 TEMPLE L.
REV. 875, 880–81 (2015) (describing the Court’s decision in United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010), which imposed a dramatic burden on judges to independently
review Chapter 13 plans for compliance with bankruptcy law, and noting several other Supreme
Court cases that impose similar expectations on professionals in the bankruptcy process).
93. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1410 (holding “[t]he Act seeks to help consumers by
preventing consumer bankruptcies in the first place, while the Code creates and maintains the
‘delicate balance of a debtor’s protections and obligations’”) (quoting Kokoszka v. Belford, 417
U.S. 642, 651 (1974)).
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A. Procedural Ideals and Practical Realities
One of the most salient aspects of the majority’s opinion is its
confidence in the structural protections of consumer bankruptcy, and
particularly in chapter 13 trustees’ capacity to address the problem of
stale-debt claims. Yet as the briefing made clear and the dissent
highlights, trustees are inadequately positioned to address time-barred
debt claims on a widespread basis. 94 First, as noted above, many
trustees manage thousands of cases at a time, and each case can
include any number of individual proofs of claim. Second, trustees
typically do not have ready access to information on the applicable
statute of limitations and whether the statute of limitations has been
tolled or revived. For these reasons, it is logistically infeasible for
trustees to subject every filed claim to detailed scrutiny. Moreover, the
Bankruptcy Code requires the trustee to object to proofs of claim “if a
purpose would be served” by doing so.95 Although the Code does not
explain when “a purpose would be served,” this language is generally
understood to require trustees to object when “other creditors would
receive a greater distribution if the claims objections were pursued.”96
Accordingly, trustees could arguably violate their statutory
obligations if they undertake a review of claims that is more robust
than the economics of the individual case might justify. To be sure, it
is difficult to make this calculus in chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, where
most plans contemplate some distribution to unsecured creditors, and
where the administrative costs are spread across the chapter 13
system.97 Yet to some extent, the pressure to more fully police claims
is in tension with the trustee’s fiduciary duties to the estate.
94. See id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioner at 23, Midland Funding,
LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348).
95. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(5) (2012); § 1302(b)(1) (2012).
96. Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 147, 176 (2006) (discussing the duty to object in the chapter 7
context); W. HOMER DRAKE, JR., ET AL., CHAPTER 13: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 13 (2d ed.
2017) (noting “[a] Chapter 13 trustee is likely to object to a proof of [a] claim when, inter alia, she
becomes aware that the claim is objectionable and its allowance will dilute the recovery to the
unsecured claimants”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1302.03(d) (Richard Levin & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2017) (suggesting a purpose will frequently be served in chapter 13 cases,
“since substantial distributions are likely to be made to holders of allowed claims”); Thompson v.
Bronitsky, No. 13-cv-04793-WHO, 2014 WL 2452043, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014) (collecting
case law supporting the contention that the trustee has the discretion not to object to the claim if
she finds no purpose would be served).
97. See Henry E. Hildebrand III, A Chapter 13 Trustee’s Duty to Object to Claims: An
Obligation to Bring Fairness to the System, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 40, 40 (2012); Director
Addresses the 35th Annual Convention of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees, U.S.

[CORRECTED](8)51.2_BRUCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/25/19 8:45 PM

2018]MIDLAND FUNDING’S EFFECT ON STALE-DEBT CLAIMS 449

Other aspects of the Court’s opinion are likewise out of touch
with bankruptcy’s procedural realities. For example, the Court
expressed concern that FDCPA litigation would cause more
bankruptcy-related matters to be resolved in ordinary civil courts.98
This statement does not account for two important factors. First,
FDCPA claims can be asserted as adversary proceedings, which
typically are resolved by a bankruptcy judge and within the context of
the bankruptcy case.99 Second, federal district courts routinely handle
matters relating to pending and completed bankruptcy cases.100 As the
dissent notes, “there is nothing new about the inquiry that courts would
be required to undertake; it is no different than the analyses they
conduct every day.”101
The Court also states that a debtor could benefit if a stale claim is
filed and thereafter discharged.102 Yet payment of a stale-debt claim
in bankruptcy can revive the statute of limitations, placing a debtor
whose chapter 13 case does not end with a discharge in a worse
position.103 More to the point, this statement fails to appreciate that the
debtor can herself obtain the benefits of a discharge of time-barred
debt, whether or not the creditor files a claim. The debtor must simply
list the time-barred debt on her schedules, and if her case is successful
and no objection is filed, that debt will be permanently discharged.104

DEP’T OF JUST.: JUST. NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ust/speechestestimony/director-addresses-35th-annual-convention-national-association-bankruptcy-trustees
(suggesting the duty to object to claims is “more clear cut” in chapter 13 cases because “the costs
of administration are more broadly spread out among perhaps millions of creditors across many
thousands of cases”).
98. See Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1414, 1415 (expressing concern that applying the
FDCPA in this context would “permit postbankrutpcy litigation in an ordinary civil court” and
noting that neither the FDCPA nor the Bankruptcy Code provides a “good reason to believe that
Congress intended an ordinary civil court applying the Act to determine answers to these
bankruptcy-related questions”).
99. For example, the debtor in Crawford brought her claim as an adversary proceeding. See
Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2014).
100. Kara Bruce, The Debtor Class, 88 TUL. L. REV. 21, 53 (2013) (discussing the frequency
with which non-bankruptcy courts resolve bankruptcy-related claims and the statutory provisions
that facilitate such resolution).
101. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 n.5 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 1410.
103. See id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that if a chapter 13 case does not
proceed to a discharge, any payments made on stale debts during bankruptcy will revive the statute
of limitations).
104. Some creditors have argued that listing the debt on the debtor’s schedules revived the debt
in question. See, e.g., In re Vaughn, 536 B.R. 670, 677 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2015). The author is unaware

[CORRECTED](8)51.2_BRUCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

450

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

4/25/19 8:45 PM

[Vol. 51:435

B. Policing Bankruptcy Claims
At oral argument, members of the Court appeared concerned that
FDCPA claims would duplicate remedies already provided by the
bankruptcy code and applicable law.105 Yet, the outcome of Midland
Funding in fact creates a remedial gap.106 Courts have considered and
rejected several alternative remedies to the problem of stale-debt
claims. For example, most courts have held that filing a stale-debt
claim is not sanctionable conduct under Rule 9011 of the Bankruptcy
Code.107 For similar reasons, courts have rejected arguments that this
behavior can be sanctioned under the court’s inherent authority or
section 105 powers.108 Federal and state non-bankruptcy claims for
vexatious litigation and unfair and deceptive practices have likewise
failed.109 Without the use of FDCPA liability or an amendment to the

of any cases in which this argument has been successful. See, e.g., id.; Biggs v. Mays, 125 F.2d
693, 697 (8th Cir. 1942) (citations omitted).
105. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S.
Ct. 1407 (2017) (No. 16-348), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf (“We then have the FTC which could do such a thing. We have
the sanctions in the Bankruptcy Code, and now you want this, too?” (quoting Breyer, J.)).
106. Kara J. Bruce and Alex P.E. Sickler, Private Remedies and Access to Justice in a PostMidland World, 34 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 369–382 (describing how various efforts to
address the problem of stale-debt claims in the absence of FDCPA liability have failed).
107. Edwards v. LVNV Funding, LLC (In re Edwards), 539 B.R. 360, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2015) (“[G]iven the split of authority in this circuit and elsewhere . . . there is no basis for
sanctioning the defendants for filing their proofs of claim in this case in any event.”); In re Freeman,
540 B.R. 129, 144 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[G]iven the split in the case law, it is difficult to see
how sanctions under Rule 9011(b)(2) can be imposed on claimants filing stale proofs of
claim . . . .”); Casmatta v. Resurgent Capital Servs., L.P. (In re Freeman-Clay), No. 14-20400drd13, 2017 WL 3841739, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Sept. 1, 2017) (“[T]he mere filing of a claim
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, even by an entity with knowledge of the bar and
without a good faith basis for contravening the defense, is not itself sanctionable if the expiration
of the statute of limitations does not extinguish the claim under the applicable law.”). But see In re
Sekema, 523 B.R. 651, 654 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2015) (holding that filing a stale-debt claim is
sanctionable under Rule 9011).
108. See, e.g., Casmatta, 2017 WL 3841739, at *9 (holding that it is inappropriate to impose
sanctions under the court’s inherent or section 105 powers because the creditor’s conduct is not
“entirely without color and motivated by improper purposes”).
109. See, e.g., Keeler v. PRA Receivables Mgmt., LLC (In re Keeler), 440 B.R. 354, 367
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2009) (holding claims for violation of Pennsylvania consumer protection laws are
preempted by bankruptcy law); In re Chaussee, 399 B.R. 225, 229–34 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008)
(holding that claims under the Washington Consumer Protection Act for filing time-barred proofs
of claim were preempted by the Bankruptcy Code and Rules); Pariseau v. Asset Acceptance, LLC
(In re Pariseau), 395 B.R. 492, 494–95 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding that similar claims under
the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade
Practices Act are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code).
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Bankruptcy Code or Rules, the only clear recourse for time-barred
debt claims is case-by-case review and objection.110
In most jurisdictions, the onus of this task falls squarely on
chapter 13 trustees. Indeed, the Executive Director of the United States
Trustee Program, which supervises chapter 13 trustees in most states,
has made several statements underscoring his expectations that
trustees will enhance their review of claims for statute-of-limitations
defenses. 111 Putting aside the logistical challenges this presents, it also
may increase the costs of administering bankruptcy cases, which
ultimately are borne by creditors who comply with bankruptcy law and
procedure. Moreover, it is unclear that this result will curb the practice
of filing time-barred debt claims, as debt buyers stand to profit if even
a small percentage of the filed claims slip through the cracks.
C. Midland Funding’s Potential Impact on FDCPA Jurisprudence
The Court’s ruling in Midland Funding might also drive the
development of FDCPA jurisprudence in several distinct respects.
First, while the Court did not decide the question before the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson v. Midland Funding—whether the Bankruptcy
Code impliedly repeals the FDCPA—the Court nevertheless
expressed concern about applying the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters.
It emphasized that the Bankruptcy Code and the FDCPA have
“different purposes and structural features,” and stated that permitting
FDCPA claims in bankruptcy cases could upset the “‘delicate balance’
of debtor protections and obligations underlying the Bankruptcy
Code.”112
Lower courts might interpret the Court’s language as a soft
rejection of the FDCPA’s application in bankruptcy. Yet, to do so

110. See, e.g., Keeler, 440 B.R. at 368–69 (“Absent some creditor impropriety in completing
the proof of claim form constituting misconduct falling within the scope of section 105(a), or Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 9011, or within the scope of a non-bankruptcy law provision that is in harmony with
the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor or trustee’s only redress for stale proofs of claim is the disallowance
of the claim under section 502(b).”).
111. See Director Addresses the 52nd Annual Seminar of the National Association of Chapter
13 Trustees, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.: JUST. NEWS (July 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/ust/
speeches-testimony/director-addresses-52nd-annual-seminar-national-association-chapter-13trustees (“Even though it increases the cost of administration, and those costs ultimately are borne
by legitimate creditors, I am calling upon all chapter 13 trustees to identify stale debt claims and to
object to stale debt claims that they uncover.”).
112. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1414–15 (2017).
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would depart significantly from the Court’s existing jurisprudence on
the intersection of federal statutes.
The Supreme Court has long held that “[w]hen two statutes are
capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly
expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as
effective.”113 The Court will find that one statute impliedly repeals the
other only “where provisions in two statutes are in ‘irreconcilable
conflict,’ or where the latter Act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and ‘is clearly intended as a substitute.’”114 Most circuit courts
that have considered the intersection of the FDCPA and the
Bankruptcy Code have found that the two statutes can peacefully
coexist. And, as I discuss elsewhere, the case law to the contrary has
significant analytical flaws.115
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently explained that
overlapping enforcement structures might represent a thoughtful
component of legislative design, rather than an improper duplication
of remedies. In Pom Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola, Inc.,116 the Court
held that competitor companies were entitled to bring private lawsuits
asserting violations of the Lanham Act, even though the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act purported to comprehensively regulate the subject
of the dispute.117 The Court noted that it “is quite consistent with the
congressional design to enact two different statutes, each with its own
mechanisms to enhance the protection of competitors and
consumers.”118
The lessons of Pom Wonderful have direct application to the
intersection of the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code. While the
Bankruptcy Code provides a comprehensive process for the allowance
and disallowance of claims, the FDCPA augments bankruptcy’s
framework by providing additional consumer-debtor protections.119
These protections operate to require creditors who qualify as “debt
collectors” under the FDCPA to refrain from behavior that violates the
113. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 674 (2007) (quoting
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); see also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred
Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001) (same).
114. Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003), amended by, 852 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. Miss.
2011).
115. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 5–7.
116. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
117. Id. at 2238.
118. Id. at 2239.
119. See Bruce, supra note 2, at 10.
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FDCPA. This clear and well-reasoned precedent should overshadow
the Court’s more casual statements of concern in Midland Funding.
And relatedly, litigants should not hesitate to invoke the FDCPA to
challenge bankruptcy-related activities that violate the Act.120
In Midland Funding, the Court also suggested that courts should
apply a heightened standard to determine whether communications in
bankruptcy are false, deceptive, or misleading under the FDCPA.121
The Court stated that “to determine whether a statement is misleading
normally ‘requires consideration of the legal sophistication of its
audience.’”122 It characterized the audience in bankruptcy as including
the chapter 13 trustee, “who must examine proofs of claim and, where
appropriate, pose an objection.”123 This language appears to embrace
a “competent trustee” standard, rather than the least sophisticated or
unsophisticated consumer standard typically applied in FDCPA
actions.124 At least one circuit court has applied a “competent
attorney” standard to address whether proofs of claim filed in a
bankruptcy case violate the FDCPA. 125 But there, the debtor had been
represented by counsel at all stages in the proceedings.126 The Court’s
opinion in Midland Funding appears to take this one step further,
applying a heightened standard in all bankruptcy cases, based on the
fact that a trustee is always present.127 To the extent that lower courts
interpret this ruling as such, it risks further reduction in the
applicability of the FDCPA to bankruptcy matters.
The potential effect of these statements pales in comparison to the
likely impact of another recent Supreme Court case on the future of
FDCPA litigation. In Henson v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc.,128
the Court held that Santander Bank was not a “debt collector” under
the FDCPA because it had purchased the debt at issue as part of a
portfolio and therefore was not engaged in the collection of “debts

120. Id.
121. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1409 (2017).
122. Id. at 1413.
123. Id.
124. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017)
(No. 16-348) (arguing for a competent trustee standard).
125. See Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2157 (2017).
126. Id. at 736.
127. Midland Funding, 137 S. Ct. at 1420.
128. 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017).
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owed . . . another.”129 This decision calls into serious question the
FDCPA’s applicability to third-party purchasers of debt, like Midland
Funding. It also may provide a roadmap for creditors to strategically
avoid application of the FDCPA to their businesses.130 Yet, as I
discuss elsewhere, Henson was decided on extremely narrow grounds
and leaves open several alternative arguments for applying the Act to
third-party debt buyers.131
V. CONCLUSION
While Midland Funding has halted the flurry of FDCPA litigation
proceeding through bankruptcy, district, and appellate courts
throughout the nation, it may well encourage the continued filing of
proofs of claim for time-barred debt. Despite the Court’s high praise
of the competence of chapter 13 trustees, this decision places
significant—and perhaps unattainable—regulatory burdens on their
shoulders.
The bankruptcy system has already begun the work of responding
to these regulatory challenges through law and rule reform,132 targeted
enforcement action, and non-FDCPA litigation strategies.133 With
time and sustained attention to the problem, the bankruptcy system
will adapt. Yet, the impact of the Court’s rulings in Midland Funding
and Henson could significantly affect the future viability of FDCPA
actions, both in consumer bankruptcy cases and beyond.

129. Id. at 1721–22, 1724.
130. See Kara Bruce, The Supreme Court’s 2017 FDCPA Rundown, BANKR. L. LTR., Sept.
2017, at 1, 9–10.
131. Id. at 9.
132. See ABI Announces Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.abi.org/newsroom/press-releases/abi-announces-commission-on-consumer-ba
nkruptcy (discussing the American Bankruptcy Institute’s recent announcement of the formation
of a Commission on Consumer Bankruptcy Issues).
133. See, e.g., Order Denying Atlas Acquisition LLC and Avischild’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ Class Certification Claims, No 16-03235 (Bankr S.D. Tex. May 19, 2017).

